[Todos] La letra chica de la seguridad, charla de Martin Abadi, Miercoles 4 Agosto, 13hs, aula E24

[Veronica Becher]

Confirmo el aula y aprovecho para mandar un recordatorio de la charla:


Miércoles 4 de Agosto, a las 13hs,  Pabellón I, aula E24

                 La letra chica de la seguridad
                  (The fine print of security)

                         Martín Abadi
               Microsoft Research Silicon Valley &
             University of California at Santa Cruz

 	Resumen.   Los modelos de seguridad son frecuentemente
 	útiles pero simplistas: no consideran todos los ataques
 	posibles. Esta charla tratará el problema de la corrección
 	de estos modelos, más específicamente para sistemas
 	criptográficos y para un método	de protección de programas
 	("layout randomization").

 	(abajo pueden leer un resumen en inglés, más extendido)

¡Están todos invitados!

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"The fine print of security"
Martín Abadi
Microsoft Research Silicon Valley &
University of California at Santa Cruz

Abstract: Simple views of systems are often convenient in their design
and analysis. However, attackers may attempt to exploit any
oversimplification. For security, it is therefore useful to understand
the value and the limitations of simplistic models. Computational
soundness theorems, which are the main subject of this  lecture, can
sometimes shed light on this question. We discuss them first in the
context of security protocols. There, two distinct, rigorous views of
cryptography have developed over the years. One of the views relies on a
simple but  powerful symbolic approach; the other, on a detailed
computational model that considers issues of probability and complexity.

In the last decade, however, we have made substantial progress in
bridging the gap between these views. This progress, of which a paper
with Phil Rogaway was one of the early steps, is due to many researchers.
By now, this line of work provides computational justifications for
formal treatments of cryptographic operations and security protocols,
and  also explores hybrid  approaches. Similar ideas can apply in the
domain of software protection, although they are less mature in this
domain. Specifically, we can relate high-level security guarantees,
of the kind offered by programming language semantics, with lower-level
properties of implementations. Layout randomization, one popular and
effective implementation technique, again brings up issues of probability
and complexity.

The lecture introduces some recent work with Gordon Plotkin on this topic.

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